I. Introduction
The idea of protecting consumers by mandatory minimum performance standards and controls over unfair contract terms (“UCT”) gained worldwide acceptance. A change in the relationships between consumers and sellers over the decades of the modern economy undermined the concept of caveat emptor and prompted policymakers towards non-excludible standards that goods and services have to meet.[1] However, recent data on failures to meet consumer guarantees[2] and the use of UCT[3] in consumer contracts in Australia suggest that the system does not work efficiently as stronger parties abuse their position to the detriment of consumers. Since this may also be a problem in Singapore,[4] I assess in this essay whether Australia and Singapore should change the law and adopt sanctions (civil penalties or regulatory sanctions) for non-compliance with the existing regulations to protect consumers optimally. I argue that having such sanctions in some areas would be a good step towards optimal consumer protection. Both states should empower their courts and regulators appropriately, provided that the reforms will be followed by appropriate education, improvements in access to justice and enforcement, too.
II. The problem
The law in Australia does not operate as expected. It seems to address the problems that consumers face, but data on how consumer protections operate in practice suggest that often, consumers cannot get the redress they are entitled to, or they must struggle with UCTs daily.
Starting with consumer guarantees, almost one third of all consumers problems related to products were concerned faulty, unsafe or poor quality product.[5] It is assumed that almost every third consumer who requests a remedy does not receive it despite being entitled to obtain it.[6] Although this figure is just an estimation, one may reasonably expect that the number of consumers deprived of protection under consumer guarantees is significant.[7]
Regarding the contracts, the ACCC received 5.720 contacts alleging potential UCTs concerns.[8] The Australian Small Business and Family Enterprise Ombudsman (ASBFEO) indicates that despite current regulations, UCTs are still present in almost all standard form contracts. Moreover, most small business complaints concern the clauses that ASFBEO had considered unfair in the past.[9]
These kinds of problems are present in Singapore, too. Data on the operation of “Lemon Law”[10] suggest that enforcing statutory rights by consumers is troublesome and (like in Australia)[11] it is more difficult to obtain a replacement (or a refund, as one may imply) for high-value goods or services so when these are at stake consumers often end up with less favourable remedies.[12] The case law on contract fairness is sparse, which is unsurprising given that litigation is costly and time consuming.[13] Summing up, consumers rarely litigate,[14] and enforcing statutory rights is difficult.[15]
Above indicates that the problems are common to both jurisdictions. The question is whether Australia and/or Singapore should tackle these problems by adopting sanctions for failing to meet consumer guarantees and other mandatory performance standards for suppliers, or for using UCTs. I try to answer this question by maneuvering between and applying the following principles: efficient allocation of risk, deterrent effect of breaches, incentives and compliance and clarity of the law.
III. Failures to Meet Consumer Guarantees or Other Mandatory Performance Standards for Suppliers
Consumer guarantees in Australia are contained in Part 3-2 (Division 1) of the Australian Consumer Law (“ACL”) with remedies provided by Part 5-4 of the ACL[16] Consumer guarantees in Singapore are contained in the Supply of Goods Act 1982[17] with remedies provided in Part 3 of the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act 2003 (“CP(FT)A”).[18]
Since consumer guarantees are very similar in both jurisdictions,[19] and consumers in both states are pushed towards private actions to obtain redress, arguments relevant to Australia in this chapter are largely applicable to the Singaporean law regime too. In both states, substantive law on guarantees failures providing consumers with different remedies (e.g., repair, refund, replacement) theoretically address the problems that consumers face in practice.
However, Australian and Singaporean courts cannot impose civil sanctions in addition to remedies, in case of consumer guarantees failure. Moreover, consumers face several barriers in accessing justice and are not willing to engage in long and costly process of obtaining a remedy, particularly when goods of low values are at stake.[20] Since suppliers are unlikely to be sued, they may not give due care to deliver non-faulty goods or services to the market and provide remedies when guarantees failure occur. In other words, suppliers may use their unequal bargaining power to calculate the risk of non-compliance considering the method, probability, and minor negative consequences of anticipated private action. Adopting civil or regulatory sanctions for not meeting guarantees would incentivise suppliers to improve conformity with guarantees of goods and services that are put into the market, so consumers would not have to claim remedies that often. However, these means seem to be disproportionate to achieving optimal consumer protection and may even be deemed unfair by the traders’ community.
Above all, suppliers cannot be punished just for a mere guarantee failure, be it of minor or major nature. Failing to comply with guarantees is, to some extent, inherent to any manufacturing process or service delivery. Failures occur in every segment of consumer goods, starting from everyday things, such as electric toothbrushes, through televisions and computers, up to the most expensive watches and premium vehicles, where traders’ reputation in the long perspective is of much higher value than earnings per unit. Thus, failures are not necessarily a problem of suppliers’ (or manufacturers’) greediness, dishonesty or lack of know-how, but they arise out of many complex factors (human or technical) that cannot be controlled.
In case of failure, countries generally tend towards allowing suppliers to perform their obligations and render services at issue or repair or replace faulty items[21] instead of punishing them by monetary or regulatory sanctions. Some countries adopt laws to facilitate obtaining these remedies. For example, Singapore introduced presumptions regarding guarantees failures under the Lemon Law, which changed the rules on the burden of proof.[22] Even though (as data suggests) obtaining these remedies is not easy in Australia and Singapore, this approach is generally correct. If civil or regulatory sanctions were adopted, suppliers could be punished for situations that are often out of their control, which in the long run would either raise the costs of consumer goods and services or even withdraw some of them from the market.
The case is different when safety is at issue. Citizens may reasonably expect that products released to the market are safe because a “right to safety” is principal.[23] Thus, product safety is a bottom standard (also a guarantee)[24] that all goods must meet, regardless of any concerns regarding suppliers’ capacity to prevent unintentional delivery of products that do not meet that standard. Given that unsafe products pose a risk to life or health, market forces or the mere redress (even under strict liability regime)[25] once the risk materialises may not be a sufficient incentive to deliver safe-only products to the market[26] (especially when consumers face problems with access to justice). Thus, states in general may and should adopt both civil and regulatory sanctions for non-compliance with safety standards to deter any supply of unsafe products (which may be combined, for example, with EU-style General Safety Provision).[27]
Thus, a balanced approach for guarantees failures is reflected in the current state of law both in Australia and Singapore, where consumers may require traders to provide remedies prescribed by the law, depending on the failure gravity,[28] saved that consumers may get the remedies they are entitled to. However, data invoked in Chapter II indicates that its not a case. Here is where civil and regulatory sanctions may play a positive role – they may help improve the current regulations’ operation on guarantees failures if imposed for not providing remedies.[29]
While civil sanctions alone will not improve access to justice, they may reduce inequality in bargaining power between consumers and suppliers by increasing the latter’s risk of non-compliance with statutory obligations. If the courts were allowed to impose, for example, pecuniary penalties, the risk of paying sanctions for not providing remedies should play a role in suppliers’ decisions regarding fulfilling their statutory obligations. Ultimately, consumers should get the remedies more likely, spend less time and resources on dealing with guarantees failures problems and surpassingly be more confident about purchasing goods covered by the consumer guarantees.[30] However, civil sanctions may not resolve the problem alone.
First of all, some part of non-compliance with statutory obligations is not intentionally made for the detriment of consumers. Australian Consumer Survey 2016 indicates that 9% of businesses have minimal or no understanding of business obligations and responsibilities, and 11% have “some” understanding.[31] One may infer that these figures are similar in Singapore, too.[32] It is hard to rationally expect from someone without essential obligations’ understanding that he would comply with them. Therefore, the states should focus on education, given that consumers’ awareness regarding their rights may also be lower than the last data may suggest.[33]
Secondly, policymakers should be aware of existing barriers to justice. Civil sanctions are dissuasive for businesses, but their power and beneficial implications may be overestimated without a comprehensive approach regarding practical obstacles in obtaining redress. Australian Consumer Survey 2016 indicates that the likelihood of consumers participating in dispute resolution services is only about 36%. Notably, while 28% of consumers do not participate in dispute resolution because “it is not worth the hassle or effort”, about 21% do not participate because they “don’t like confrontations”. The other 17% don’t know enough about the process, and 11% “don’t have the time” for it.[34] These numbers suggest that businesses may not be afraid of new sanctions, given that the likelihood of punishment is not that high.[35]
The above leads straight to the third point. It is unlikely that individual consumers will pursue their claims alone, particularly when goods or services at issue are of low value.[36] As some indicate, sometimes it may be more effective and efficient for a consumer advocate or regulator to initiate enforcement action on behalf of affected consumers.[37] On the other hand, it is hard to expect that ACCC, CCCS other regulator would engage in every consumer-supplier civil proceeding (but they may play a role when a case is blatant, which is not that common).[38] For instance, it is observed that neither ACCC has sufficient resources nor a culture to take action in individual cases to enforce the ACL provisions, and it focuses mostly on priority areas.[39]
Given the above, civil sanctions, such as pecuniary penalties, for not providing remedies should be adopted in Australia and Singapore (but not for services), but they may not alone enhance consumer protection to the expected optimum level. Policymakers should work on education and enhancements of dispute resolution mechanisms to reduce consumer barriers and encourage regulators (e.g. by appropriate human and financial resources) to intervene more often.
Moreover, they should be combined with regulatory sanctions and active regulators. Effective consumer protection regime requires the incentive to comply provided by an effective regulator standing behind a market and consumers.[40] Independently from powers to accept written undertakings and public warning notices, regulators should have powers to issue individual and private reprimands in minor breaches (akin to Article 58 (2) (b) of the GDPR) and infringement notices. Of course, these powers should go together with more financial and human resources to use such tools, investigate the cases, and represent consumers in civil proceedings to show that violation of consumer rights is not tolerated.
Given that in Singapore, consumer protection laws still rely to some extent on the belief that the market is to self-regulate[41] and that policymakers are keener to protect market competition rather than consumers themselves,[42] some may raise concerns about whether this approach is not too consumer-centric. However, the Singaporean approach has been changing (particularly with the adoption of the so-called “Lemon Law”) towards more consumer-friendly, and even if policymakers’ goal is to secure the market competition rather than consumers themselves, the current state of law works for the detriment of the competition, too. The problems with obtaining a redress in private actions work for the benefit of those who do not want to play it fair and strengthen the position of unfair traders in the long run.
IV. Use of Unfair Contract Terms in Consumer Contracts
The Australian UCT regime comprises the ACL and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (ASIC).[43] From 9 November 2023, the ACL prohibits businesses from proposing, using, or relying on UCTs in standard form contracts with consumers and small businesses under substantial penalties on businesses and individuals who include unfair terms in their standard form contracts.[44] Therefore, Australia already has civil penalties for the use of UCTs. Conversely, ACCC does not have strong regulatory sanctions and must recourse to courts.
Singapore’s regime on contractual fairness consists of three acts: Unfair Contract Terms Act (“UCTA”)[45] , the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act (“CP(FT)A”)[46] and the Misrepresentation Act (“MA”).[47] UCTA and MA have broader application scope as they also apply in business-to-business relations and do not have a claim limit. CP(FT)A targets contract relations more generally, while the UCTA and MA target contract terms specifically, especially those aimed at restricting liability.[48] Remedies for unfair practice [CP(FT)A] include restitution, damages, specific performance, or contract variation.[49] Additionally, any term that is contrary to UCTA or MA is ineffective.[50] Singaporean law does not allow for the imposition of civil sanctions for unfair practice and the use of unfair contract terms, such as pecuniary penalties. It does not allow for any regulatory sanctions, but CP(FT)A (contrary to UCTA and MA) entitles authorised bodies to intervene by seeking a voluntary compliance agreement, declaration, or injunction.[51]
Since Australia has enacted the law and empowered courts with pecuniary penalties to punish usage of UCTs, this problem is no longer an issue there. Civil sanctions are believed to reduce the prevalence of unfair terms in small business and consumer standard form contracts, promote a more efficient allocation of risk, and improve small business and consumer confidence when entering into standard form contracts.[52]
Singapore should follow this lead. Given that the problems with obtaining redress outlined in Chapter II for guarantees failures seem to be very similar and actual both in Australian[53] and Singaporean contractual fairness regimes,[54] they may disincentive traders from abandoning UCTs from their contracts exactly for the same reasons. Moreover, in Singapore (even more than in Australia), consumers are expected to initiate actions on their own to target terms they deem to be unfair in the first place rather than waiting for support from regulators, so civil sanctions imposed by courts seem to be natural means of protecting the market (and consumers at the end). Also, it is worth noting that while traders may not always be able to avoid guarantees failures (see Chapter III ab initio) the case with unfair contract terms is different – this is entirely on the traders’ framing of their contracts.
However, some other concerns are about making UCTs illegal and introducing penalties. Perhaps the primary concern is that determining whether a term is unfair is subjective, but there are others, e.g. rise in compliance costs or a risk that some contract-issuing businesses will not deal with certain businesses covered by these regulations.[55]
Indeed, “fairness” does not have a finite number of designates and is susceptible to various interpretations. However, this is the strength of this term – it prevents many “unfair” situations that are hard to anticipate when drafting a statute. Secondly, this term is already in the system and will not change. Thus, traders may assess – based on literature and previous jurisprudence – what it mean to ensure compliance with the law. Thirdly, it is unlikely that monetary sanctions will be overused. For example, supervisory authorities under 83(5)(a) of the GDPR may impose administrative fines up to 20 000 000 EUR, or up to 4 % of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher, for not processing personal data “fairly”, but until now they have not used that power. Finally, in case of doubts, the term may be redrafted more fairly.
Regarding the other two concerns, if the business invokes that introducing monetary penalties will raise compliance costs, then we may draw two conclusions. First, they do not see much point in spending money for compliance if courts cannot impose monetary sanctions. Second, they see the need for additional spending if the law is introduced, which means that monetary sanctions indeed work as an incentive to reduce the overall amount of UCTs. Policymakers should not be afraid that some contracting issuing business will not deal with certain businesses because there is no evidence that such situation has ever occurred. Ultimately, it is sufficient to be “fair’, and if one cannot maintain that basic standard, it is perhaps better that one would not trade at all.
Thus, civil sanctions should make traders more hesitant to include UCTs in their contracts. However, the sole addition of civil sanctions to the system may not resolve the problem. The general concerns over the role of civil sanctions in the consumer guarantees regime are actual in the contractual fairness regime, so there is no need to repeat them (please refer to Chapter III). Thus, it is essential to empower regulators with appropriate regulatory sanctions and resources (also, please refer to Chapter III in fine), which is particularly important under UCTA and MA regimes in Singapore, where regulators cannot challenge the unfair terms at all. Reliance on individual actions in targeting UCTs is not adequate, and state should not wait to intervene until the term constitutes unfair practice (i.e. intervene on CP(FT)A regulation).[56]
V. Which reforms might Australia and your chosen jurisdiction/s introduce to enhance consumer redress?
Data invoked in this research indicates that consumers in both states face problems accessing justice, especially in cases where goods and services are of low value. A match of the numbers concerning why consumers do not participate in dispute resolution mechanisms[57] with the percentage of consumers who would not make a complaint if out-of-pocket expenses were incurred[58] indicates that the money is also an issue. Even though both states are deemed to be developed countries, consumers face financial barriers when it comes to pursuing claims.
Thus, it is essential to work over access to legal aid to reduce the existing barriers by educating consumers that such an option exists and lowering eligibility criteria. Additionally, it is worth considering appointing public officers at the level of local governments (or regions in Singapore) who represent consumers’ interests against traders, without any eligible criteria in case of low-value claims. In some EU states, such officers are entitled to provide free consumer advice and legal information to protect consumer interest, sue on behalf of consumers and participate in consumer protection proceedings with their consent.[59]
VI. Summary
Neither Australia nor Singapore should have civil or regulatory sanctions just for not meeting consumer guarantees because that would create a clear imbalance in the market for the advantage of consumers and expose suppliers to risks they often cannot control. However, civil and regulatory sanctions may play a role if they could be imposed for not providing remedies to which consumers are entitled, save that the reforms will be followed also by appropriate education, improvements in access to justice and enforcement. On the other hand, both states should have sanctions against suppliers for not meeting product safety standards to have a strong disincentive against providing unsafe products to the market. Regarding UCT’s, Australia has already introduced civil sanctions for using UCT’s, which deserves praise because it should contribute to more fair contracting with weaker partners. Despite having a different regime on contractual fairness, Singapore should follow this lead, too. Both states should work on enhancing regulatory aspects in UCT’s, as an effective regulator standing behind a market and consumers is necessary for adequate consumer protection. Also, both states should consider introducing a mechanism of public officers to deal with small claims (working irrespectively of small claim tribunals) to reduce a problem of financial barriers in obtaining redress in cases of low values.
[1] Cynthia Hawes and Christian Twigg-Flesner, ‘Sales and Guarantees’ in Handbook of Research on International Consumer Law, Second Edition (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018) 172, 178 <https://www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap/edcoll/9781785368202/9781785368202.00013.xml>.
[2] ‘Consultation Regulation Impact Statement: Improving the Effectiveness of the Consumer Guarantee and Supplier Indemnification Provisions under the Australian Consumer Law’ 20.
[3] ‘Enhancements to Unfair Contract Term Protections Regulation Impact Statement’ 13.
[4] Caron Beaton-Wells et al (eds), ‘Regulating Consumer Contracts in ASEAN: Variation and Change’ in ASEAN Consumer Law Harmonisation and Cooperation: Achievements and Challenges (Cambridge University Press, 2019) 205, 250 <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/asean-consumer-law-harmonisation-and-cooperation/regulating-consumer-contracts-in-asean-variation-and-change/F89EA12818071907B3040F2A91C0E546> (‘Regulating Consumer Contracts in ASEAN’).
[5] ‘Australian Consumer Survey 2016’ 7.
[6] ‘Consultation Regulation Impact Statement: Improving the Effectiveness of the Consumer Guarantee and Supplier Indemnification Provisions under the Australian Consumer Law’ (n 2) 20.
[7] Ibid 18.
[8] ‘Enhancements to Unfair Contract Term Protections Regulation Impact Statement’ (n 3) 14.
[9] Ibid 13.
[10] ‘Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act 2003 – Singapore Statutes Online’ 13–18 <https://sso.agc.gov.sg:5443/act/cpfta2003>.
[11] ‘Consultation Regulation Impact Statement: Improving the Effectiveness of the Consumer Guarantee and Supplier Indemnification Provisions under the Australian Consumer Law’ (n 2) 19.
[12] Beaton-Wells et al (n 4) 250.
[13] Ibid 239.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid 250.
[16] ‘Competition and Consumer Act 2010, Schedule II’ <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2023C00449/Html/Volume_1, http://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2023C00449>.
[17] ‘Supply of Goods Act 1982 – Singapore Statutes Online’ <https://sso.agc.gov.sg:5443/Act/SGA1982>.
[18] ‘Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act 2003 – Singapore Statutes Online’ (n 12).
[19] Nottage and Paterson (n 5) 18; Beaton-Wells et al (n 4) 218–219. However, Singapore does not have mandatory requirements for services to be supplied with due care, so one cannot expect it to adopt sanctions regarding services.
[20] Kate Tokeley, ‘Access to Justice’ in Handbook of Research on International Consumer Law, Second Edition (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018) 413, 414–417, see also: <https://www.elgaronline.com/display/edcoll/9781785368202/9781785368202.00021.xml>; ‘Australian Consumer Survey 2016’ 37, figure 20.
[21] Hawes and Twigg-Flesner (n 1) 181.
[22] Generally, under the Lemon Law, if a defect is detected within 6 months, it is presumed that the defect existed at the time of sale or delivery and the lemon law provisions apply.
[23] ‘United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection | UNCTAD (Resolution 39/248 of 16 April 1985)’ (1985) II, 3(a) <https://unctad.org/topic/competition-and-consumer-protection/un-guidelines-for-consumer-protection>.
[24] s 54 (2) (b) of the ACL
[25] Luke Nottage, Product Safety and Labelling (UNCTAD, 21 December 2015) 12 <https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Product-Safety-and-Labeling.pdf>.
[26] For Luke Nottage, ‘Product Safety Regulation’ in Handbook of Research on International Consumer Law, Second Edition (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018) 231, 231,258, figure 10.1. <https://china.elgaronline.com/edcollchap/edcoll/9781785368202/9781785368202.00015.xml>.
[27] More on the need of introducing GSP into Australian system: L Nottage, ‘Improving the Effectiveness of the Consumer Product Safety System: Australian Law Reform in Asia-Pacific Context’ (2020) 43(4) Journal of Consumer Policy 829, 845 (‘Improving the Effectiveness of the Consumer Product Safety System’).
[28] Hawes and Twigg-Flesner (n 1) 181; Luke Nottage and Jeannie Paterson, ‘Consumer Contracts and Product Safety Law in Southeast Asia: Partly Trading Up?’ in Pasha L Hsieh and Bryan Mercurio (eds), ASEAN Law in the New Regional Economic Order (Cambridge University Press, 1st ed, 2019) 392, 18 <https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/9781108563208%23CN-bp-19/type/book_part> (‘Consumer Contracts and Product Safety Law in Southeast Asia’); Beaton-Wells et al (n 4) 218–219.
[29] ‘Consultation Regulation Impact Statement: Improving the Effectiveness of the Consumer Guarantee and Supplier Indemnification Provisions under the Australian Consumer Law’ (n 2) 37, 46.
[30] Ibid 48.
[31] ‘Australian Consumer Survey 2016’ (n 7) 70.
[32] The author is not aware of any survey concerning traders’ awareness of consumers’ rights and obligations, but the number cannot differ that much between two developed countries.
[33] Submission (No 2) to CAANZ Review of the Australian Consumer Law (22 November 2016) 1 <https://consumer.gov.au/sites/consumer/files/2016/12/Nottage-Dr-Luke-University-of-Sydney.pdf>.
[34] ‘Australian Consumer Survey 2016’ (n 7) 37, figure 20.
[35] Moreover, despite new sanctions suppliers will remain the right to question the consumers’ arguments and engage in disputes over claims’ .
[36] Tokeley (n 22) 415. However, amount of consumers willing to pursue individual claims may be increased by using legal aid paid by government or contingency fees arrangements.
[37] Beaton-Wells et al (n 4) 246.
[38] In Australia public agencies, including ACCC may get civil remedies for consumers only through application to civil courts, see: Colin Scott, ‘Enforcing Consumer Protection Laws’ in Handbook of Research on International Consumer Law, Second Edition (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018) 466, 478 <https://www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap/edcoll/9781785368202/9781785368202.00023.xml>; Tokeley (n 22) 430.
[39] Consumer Law Enforcement and Administration. Productivity Commission Research Report. (Australian Government Productivity Commision, March 2017) 97.
[40] Beaton-Wells et al (n 4) 246.
[41] Gary Low, ‘Comparative Consumer Sales Law (Singapore)’ 113, 115, 121–122.
[42] Ibid 122.
[43] Treasury, ‘Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001’ <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2021C00281/Html/Text, http://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2021C00281>.
[44] Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ‘Businesses Urged to Remove Unfair Contract Terms Ahead of Law Changes’ (Text, 11 September 2023) <https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/businesses-urged-to-remove-unfair-contract-terms-ahead-of-law-changes>.
[45] ‘Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 – Singapore Statutes Online’ <https://sso.agc.gov.sg:5443/Act/UCTA1977?ProvIds=pr11->.
[46] ‘Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act 2003 – Singapore Statutes Online’ (n 12).
[47] ‘Misrepresentation Act 1967 – Singapore Statutes Online’ <https://sso.agc.gov.sg:5443/Act/MA1967>.
[48] Sandra Booysen, ‘Twenty Years (and More) of Controlling Unfair Contract Terms in Singapore’ [2016] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 219, 220–221.
[49] ‘Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act 2003 – Singapore Statutes Online’ (n 12) 7(5)a-c,e.
[50] Booysen (n 49) 228.
[51] Ibid 226, 232.
[52] ‘Enhancements to Unfair Contract Term Protections Regulation Impact Statement’ (n 3) 33.
[53] Ibid 23, 26.
[54] Booysen (n 49).
[55] ‘Enhancements to Unfair Contract Term Protections Regulation Impact Statement’ (n 3) 44.
[56] Booysen (n 49) 232.
[57] ‘Australian Consumer Survey 2016’ (n 7) 37, figure 20.
[58] Ibid 34, figure 16.
[59] https://uokik.gov.pl/help_and_advice.php; please note that the translation into “ombudsman” is not accurate, because such an officer does not have a status like “ombudsman” in Australia.
